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sociology and development of scholarly exchange in management science between Soviets and East 
Europeans and their counterparts in North America and Europe. This is the least developed area of 
scientific exchange — the East-West connection in management. It is an important area for the field 
of management and represents a major frontier. 
One purpose of this paper is to confront directly the problems and issues from a Westerner's per-
spective. This paper does not attempt to convince the undecided or the seeptie that exchange in 
general and any management program in particular are necessary or without problems. Rather, what is 
needed is an objective analysis of the experiences to date. 
A second purpose of this paper is to reflect upon some of these experiences in exchange developers: 
What has been done? What is the greater context of scientific exchange in other fields? What have been 
patterns of exchange behavior? What are the underlying conditions helping and hindehng the exchange 
process? What are the barriers and confounding influences? Where are the resources? What alternative 
models are viable? And, what is the outlook in the next five years? 
P a n a g i o t i s F o t i l a s 
European Community and the Greek Industrial Enterprises: 
Some New Economic and Social Problems p. 23 
This publication highlights the main economic and social problems which arise for the Greek industrial 
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ficulties, foreign investment activities, the employment Situation and the working conditions. It also 
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Internal Performance Evaluation in American Multinational Enterprises p. 33 
One of the major managerial funetions is the maintenance of proper control over the Operations of a 
corporation. In fulfilling this funetion domestic corporations have utilized many different Controlling 
techniques. The key for successful Operations of any corporation, however, remains with its aecount-
ing system. It is through this System that management controls its day-to-day activities and coordi-
nates its different Operations. 
As the number of international business transactions increases, the need for coordination and control 
of the different activities of a multinational enterprise (ME) becomes more urgent. Simultaneously, 
the management of an ME must adjust its activities to the everchanging foreign environment. In addi-
tion, the passage of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 mandated the maintenance of 
adequate internal aecounting control Systems and of adequate record-keeping. In order to adhere to 
the provisions of this legislation, U.S. based MEs were forced to reexamine their information System. 
The objective of this paper is to deal with the effect of the environmental forces surrounding the 
Operations of U.S. based MEs on the selection of the aecounting tools used to control and coordinate 
these Operations. 
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The study which is reported in the present paper resulted in the following conclusions: First, firms in 
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lowing dimensions (factors): market and marketing opportunity, legal barriers and their economic 
objectives, cultural unity and physiographic barriers, political stability, and the level of economic 
development and Performance of the country. The identification in this study of those factors pre-
specified in the literature as important dimensions of a foreign market Supports the contention that 
the health care industry also views the same environmental factors as relevant when evaluating foreign 
markets. However, whether they view these factors as equally important with other industries was not 
investigated and calls for further study. Secondly, there was no statistically significant relationship 
between the companies' evaluation criteria of a foreign market and the companies's experience in over-
seas business, number of employees, R & D expenditure, total sales nor total investment. This contrast 
to expectation may be due to inaccurate reporting of data for sales, investment, and research and 
development expenditures by the companies, or due to non-rcpresentativeness of the responses to the 
entire industry. Further research is thus suggested, since the present investigation was only exploratory 
in nature. 
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Multinational Corporations face profit losses due to unanticipated movements in foreign exchange 
rates relative to the home currency. This paper formulates the short-term money management problem 
with goals of matching maturing monetary assets and liabilities for each period in a multi-period 
horizon subject to policy and operating constraints. Usingthe financial control archtype of independ-
ent foreign-subsidiary profit centers, the multiple goals programming model is denominated in units 
of foreign currency precluding the need for spot exchange rate forecasts. A rolling horizon model per-
mits decision-making for the current period based on strategies for two future periods. An illustration 
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Numerous examples of business problems created by cultural insensitivity can be found. Many sug-
gested remedies for avoidingsuch problems focus on improving managers' cultural awareness and inter-
personal communication skills. As important as these skills are, however, businesses use specific 
administrative Systems to manage their affairs also. Multinationals may design into these Systems a 
cultural bias without realizing it and not much is known about the impact of culture on these 
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Performance of multinationals. The concept of culture is defined and integrated into an Organization 
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The problem of investment externalities is presented as a special field of uncertainty within the invest-
ment decision process. Conditions for the relevance of such effects to decision makers are identified 
(knowledge, actuality of affected needs, time horizon, organizational power) and the resulting dif-
ficulties of prediction are discussed. Having explored some motives of management to deal with 
externalities a set of strategies (Information, Elimination, participation) suitable to fight relevant invest-
ment externalities is developed and subjected to ashort comparative examination. It is recommended 
to pay already during the investment decision process more attention to possible non-market con-
sequences of private investment. 
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seems that occurrence of these types is only weakly related to characteristics of the product-mix. 
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The purpose of this paper is to focus on what roles the chairmen and the boards of Israelian state-
owned companies actually play. According to the views of many chairmen, boards have an adequate 
number of members, but there is a problem with enforcing attendance. Some directors who are 
government officials do not have the business skills and experience needed to direct the managing 
director. Board meeting time is not well-utilized due to either the lack of written background reports 
or the lack of advance preparation by directors. Directors and part-time chairmen are not receiving 
compensation for their time. In most cases, boards approve the annual budget without question and 
in some companies, boards evaluate the Overall Performance of the Company. Individual ministers have 
considerable power over the companies under their control. Some chairmen view their role as that of a 
"watchdog" to control the activities of the chief executive officer and to provide the government with 
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has the cost which is associated with it, therefore, the phenomenon should alert the attention of 
management. This article discusses the topic and describes a study presenting data of labor turnover 
costs for different types of Jobs. Five major components of turnover are defined, and the costs asso-
ciated with each of them are presented and discussed. Results indicate that, among the five turnover 
components, the component "training of a new employee" has the highest cost. In addition, the 
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nature of Egyptian management. It also identifies most salient features of that management as bureau-
cratic, ill-trained, disoriented, and negligent in human resource development. The latter section con-
tends that the future of management and Egypt is inseparable. Therefore, without resolving inherited 
ideological paradoxes, development of a concept of man, and fostering professionalism, Egypt will 
continue to suffer. 
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A . P i c o t * 
The Management of Investment Externalities 
Within the Private Investment Decision Process 
Externalities as Non-Market Consequences of Investment Decisions 
Investment decisions set long-lasting premises for the future production possibilities of a 
firm. Usually the evaluation of an investment alternative depends on the expected profits 
induced by the pecuniary flows which accompany the investment process. As long as the 
market mechanism can demand adequate compensations for all costs caused by the 
investment from the Investor, and, at the same time, return to him equivalents for all 
goods which his investment produces for other subjects, the above mentioned valuation 
method is sufficient. This holds true for the objectives of the investor as well as for those 
of all others who are affected by the investment. 
This picture, however, is unrealistic- Nearly every investment decision produces con-
sequences which cannot be compensated by the market mechanism or by other institu-
tions and which at the same time either injure or further the goals and needs of those 
members of society who ere not involved in the decision process. Economic theory has 
called such consequences "externalities", i. e. the production functions or the Utility 
functions of economic subjects show some arguments throughout which cannot be 
controlled by the subjects alone but by other decision makers1. 
In the case that these arguments are influenced by the consequences of an investment 
decision, externalities arise: The affected subjects cannot get compensation for deteri-
oration caused by non-market interdependencies of their preference functions or produc-
tion functions. They do not have to pay for an amelioration of their Situation. A legal or 
other power basis for compensation does not exist in either case. In the first case, the 
investor avoids expenses for reductions of values caused by his investment. In the second 
case, he loses possible returns induced by his investment. 
Consequently, participation in a decision and concern about non-market decision con-
sequences differ. Those who participate in an investment decision are only in part identi-
cal with the group which is affected by the decision consequences, and not all affected 
persons participate in the decision or can be put in Status quo ante with the help of 
the market or other legal remedies2. 
It is plausible to suppose that investors try to internalize the positive externalities of 
their decisions as far as possible in order to maximize returns. On the other hand, prob-
lems of business strategy as well as social conflicts may arise from the appearance of 
negative externalities. This is due to the competition for gratuitious utilization of external 
resources among possible users (e. g. natural environment as a resource for waste deposi-
tion as well as for raw materials or recreation). Therefore, the problems discussed in the 
following will be mainly those dealing with negative externalities of investment decisions. 
* P r o f e s s o r D r . A r n o l d P i c o t is P r o f e s s o r o f M a n a g e m e n t a n d O r g a n i z a t i o n at t h e Technische U n i v e r -
sität H a n n o v e r , H a n n o v e r , F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c o f G e r m a n y , 
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Conditions for the Emergence of Relevant Investment Externalities 
As the concept of externalities refers to all possible non-market consequences of invest-
ment decisions, its extension is extremly wide 3. However, only a small set of the large 
number of externalities is relevant, to an investor as well as to public policy. It isn't 
the existence of externalities as such which is problematic, but only their valuation by the 
social and economic environment. The environment, however, changes continnously. Be-
cause of the limited reversibility of investment decisions, it is desirable to find out the 
possible externalities and to investigate their relevance before the decision is made. 
This task poses remarkable problems: 
Firstly, the differentiation between relevant and less important externalities must be 
vague. The interested views of the parties involved make this clear. Externalities of an 
investment decision are called r e l e v a n t f o r t h e business p o l i c y as far as the economic and 
political consequences caused in the business environment can possibly injure the invest-
ment success or the goal achievement and the existence of the firm as a whole. Exter-
nalities are r e l e v a n t f o r p u b l i c p o l i c y as far as they may lead to a deterioration of the 
overall allocation and to a reduction of the support of the actual political representatives 
by important groups or even to an act of retreat from the social order. Both these views 
of relevance — the business and the public view — are interdepent and overlap each other. 
Secondly, both the naming of the concrete conditions on which externalities become 
relevant and the forecasting of the future formation of these conditions raise great dif-
ficulties. Literature, as far as concerned with the problems of externalities, hardly notices 
this aspect, though it is very important in dealing with externalities in practice. 
Consequently, some important conditions for the emergence of relevant externalities of 
investment decisions will be characterized. 
The Knowledge of Possible Externalities of an Investment Alternative 
The knowledge of future external injuries caused by investments is the necessary basis for 
consideration of the relevance of external side effects. 
First, there are great problems in determining the secondary effects of an investment in 
advance. This determination depends on the questions posed in order to structure future 
consequences. Naturally, these questions are always s e l e c t i v e , and are based on the 
present value System and experiences of the decision makers. In this way, the future value 
orientation and needs are extrapolated from the present Situation. Methods like Techno-
logy Assessment or Environmental Impact Analysis can supply a certain systematic help 
during this process4. 
Furthermore, it is a question of i n f o r m a t i o n costs and Conventions as to when such an 
investigation can be considered as finished and on what degree of uncertain knowledge 
about future events planning for externalities should be based. 
Finally, the quantity of knowledge about future externalities depends considerably on 
the regulation of the bürden o f p r o o f : If the (possibly) affected persons have to prove 
the harmfulness, what still seems to be the usual case, then a great part of the relevant 
knowledge will only emerge when the externalities as a consequence of the investment 
have already (partly) happened. It must further be mentioned that the possibly affected 
persons often do not dispose of the means for investigating in such questions. 
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If, however, the investor is to prove the harmlessness of his alternative, the fundamental 
examination and the forecasting of externalities might be more extensive, but the read-
iness for investment with high externality risks would, on the other hand, decrease. 
The analysis of a Single investment is, in most cases, not an appropriate basis for the 
valuation of its harmfulness. Rather, in many cases, — especially for the estimation of 
possible impacts on natural and social environment — it is necessary to have information 
about the quantity and regional destribution of similar investments, as well as about their 
m e l t i n g t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r producers o f e x t e r n a l i t i e s . At the same time, the imputation 
of externalities on individual firms becomes more difficult, if not impossible. The know-
ledge for making such imputations is hardly available in the individual process of invest-
ment decisions. To avoid this problem we would need a central ex ante coordination of 
all competing investment projects — a procedure which, as we know, is neither very 
practical nor efficient with respect to economic adaptation to change. 
As well as the question of whether the knowledge about possible future externalities is 
principally available, that of w h e t h e r t h i s k n o w l e d g e is a c t u a l l y a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e a f f e c t e d 
persons also plays role. It is quite possible that investment consequences are not preceived 
as injuries and therefore do not become relevant because the affected persons are not 
informed about the character of these consequences. 
The Time Horizon of Decision and the Range of Externalities 
Furthermore, the distribution of external investment consequences over time must 
be investigated and then be compared with the Service life of the investment. If the non-
market consequences happen within the Service life, then the probability increases that 
they become relevant for the policy of the firm because the affected persons could pos-
sibly react. If the external decision consequences are expected only in a period later than 
the present or subsequent to the Service life of the investment, the firm must not neces-
sarily reckon with reactions influencing the investment success. Spillovers on other future 
investment projects are not very probable though they cannot be completely excluded. 
The tendency to a higher valuation of present problems compared with future prob-
lems reduces the engagement of contemporaries for the possible burdens of their de-
scendants. Normally the periods for which decision makers (businessmen or politicians) 
have to prove the success of their actions are relatively short. This fact favours the dis-
regard or non-perception of long-term decision consequences and thereby the transfer of 
negative long-term consequences of present investments to later generations6. 
The Actual Need-Level of the Affected Persons 
The above mentioned conditions are necessary for the rise of relevant externalities of 
investment decisions, but not sufficient. External decision consequences will only lead 
to considerations or actions by the affected persons when they meet a corresponding 
disposition, i. e. i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e emergence o f effects m u s t t o u c h a c t u a l needs a n d 
c e n t r a l a t t i t u d e s 1 . According to the degree to which the perceived investment conse-
quences influence the perceived satisfaction of actual needs and meet dominant attitudes, 
externalities may be classified as relevant. 
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Only in this case might the valuation of the perceived injuries by the affected persons be 
higher than the supposed costs of effective resistance against the disturbing side effects. 
Consequently, a concrete reaction by those affected is probable. 
Attitudes and actual needs are differently defined and weighted according to individual 
experience and information level, individual self-perception and situational factors. 
Because of the influence of the special socio-economic Situation on the valuation of 
decision consequences by external groups, it is especialiy difficult to predetermine pos-
sible relevant externalities of long-term investments, even if, for example, the ecologi-
cal knowledge about unavoidable impact on the environment of an investment were at 
our disposal. 
Interdependencies between satisfaction of needs by market processes and the perceived 
relevance of externalities caused by market processes show this more clearly the public 
discussion on negative side effects of the corresponding investments by the extensive 
market satisfaction of the desire for individual transport. The better satisfaction of 
transportation needs as well as the simultanious cumulation of transport investments is 
increased allow the emergence of considerable externalities, and, at the same time, allow 
their valuation as "relevant". The actuyl debate on energy supply is another example. 
I n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e urgence o f t h e needs 
w h i c h will p r i m a r i l y be s a t i s f i e d by t h e m will exceed t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e needs w h i c h 
a r e i n j u r e d by t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g s e c o n d a r y consequences. 
The Organizationa 1 Power of the Affected Persons 
Furthermore, it is important for the future relevance of the externalities to which degree 
those affected are able to make themselves heard in the surroundings of the firm or in 
public. This, finally, is a question of power, i. e. of the possibility of influence by an 
individual or a group of individuals on the future behavior of the investor. Organized and 
institutionalized interests will be able to articulate themselves and succeed earlier than 
non-organized dispersed interests of the individuals and informal groups. However, 
organized representitives are, mostly, characterized by a better information basis and by 
a stronger long-term orientation to the future8. In consequence, the question arises if 
actual needs, which are affected by externalities of investment decisions, dispose (or will 
dispose) of an effective organizational representation in the public. 
The Dynamics of the Relevance of Investment Externalities 
Figure 1 summarizes the conditions described above. It emphasizes the dynamic side of 
the problem. The letter-symbols put in brackets represent different subrets of externa-
lities accodring to the change of the conditions over time (vertical direction) and to the 
perspective of the decision maker (horizontal direction). The figure shows that both the 
amount of the known as well as of the relevant externalities change in the course of 
time. This is due to changes in factual knowledge, time horizon, actuality of needs and/or 
organizational power. Inspite of internalization of Single externalities during the process 
of the investment decision (a, b, e,) relevant externalities, which differ from those anti-
cipated earlier and which can injure the success of investment and business (a, f, h), still 
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F i g u r e 1 : P r o b l e m s o f F o r e c a s t i n g t h e R e l e v a n c e o f I n v e s t m e n t - E x t e r n a l i t i e s 
presence 
future 
Conditions of relevance of 
externalities: 
1. Factual knowledge 
about externalities 
2. Time horizon of af-
fected persons 
3. Actuality of needs 
4. Organizational power 
Supposed State of condi-
tions during the invest-
ment decision process 
Real State of conditions 
during Implementation 
and consequence of the 
investment 
Known externalities 
(a,b, c, d, e, f) 
~(a, c, d, e, f, g, h) 
Externalities clas-
sif ied as relevant 
(a,b,e, f) 
(a, e, f, h) 
Externalities inter-
nalized in the deci-
sion process 
(a, b, e) 
Externalities with 
factual repercus-
sions 
(a, e, f, h) 
4^ 
appear in the future. For example the changes of conditions are interdependent. New 
unforeseen knowledge about external decison consequences causes new attitudes and new 
resistance, for example. Because of such dynamics, it is impossible to completly forecast 
the arising of turbulent fields in the socio-economic environment of business9. The 
application of heuristic and inexact methods could possibly ease the problem. All in all 
this is a relatively rarely noticed field of investment planning under uncertainty. 
Possibilities for Inclusion of Externalities into the Investment Decision 
Process 
Motives for the Analysis of Externalities by Private Investors 
Quantifying technological and social aspects of investments has cartinally been a diffi-
cult part of the investment planning. With regard to the theory of externalities, the 
private investment decision process, in contrast to the investment planning process of the 
public sector, has hardly been analysed up to this point. Without referring to the very 
doubtful concept of the "social responsibility of the f i r m " 1 0 , two motives may be seen 
which also may lead private enterprise to a voluntary (i. e. not formally imposed) analysis 
and to a partly ex ante diminution of possible externalities of investment alternatives: 
(1) Nearly every alternative demands an analysis of its compatiblity with the given 
institutional framework of the society. Within this analysis consequences of an investment 
appear which are officially regulated or prohibited (pollution and safety-standards, 
restrictions for location etc.). This analysis gives rise to the consideration whether it 
must be reckoned with future extension or intensification of the present public imposi-
tions and with Claims of the interest groups, and whether this should be anticipated with-
in the present decision process. Is it realistic to expect that some of the remaining exter-
nalities will be changing into internalities by potential demands of the groups or by public 
measures? Should, therefore, technological or organizational measures be discussed which 
would not produce these externalities? Such a behavior, indeed, could shortly lead to 
higher internal costs, but in the long run to advantages in technology, prestige, and also 
costs/returns. 
(2) Theoretical considerations11 and empirical investigations12 can support the follow-
ing proposition: The firm which engages in social responsibility activities as well as 
average enterprise will optimize its profit gial. Neither pure altruism nor extensive orienta-
tion to immediate market figures, but an engagement adapted to the average attention for 
social problems guarantees the best economic chances for surviving in a changing environ-
ment. If one accepts this hypothesis, positive and negative side effects of investment 
decisions should be exposed or eliminated to the same extent as they are regarded by 
other firms and by the public on the average. Furthermore, such a policy could also result 
in a better identification of external investors with the company's policy 1 3 . Therefore, 
externalities, which have the potential to indirectly influence the internal decision con-
sequences, have to be predicted and to be taken into account for the firm's investment 
policy and for its public presentation. 
In view of the mentioned motives, investment alternatives which least injure future public 
policy and, at the same time, produce only those externalities caused on an average by 
the firm's competitors will — ceteris paribus — be preferred. Under certain conditions, 
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this behavior will lead to a steady increase of the average consideration of externalities by 
private investors. 
In this context it must be stressed that within our discussion only such externalities are 
observed which can mediately affect the dominant goal of the investor. Other, in this 
sense indifferent externalities (which absolutely can be relevant for the society) are not 
regarded. 
Strategies for Relevance Reduction of Negative Investment Externalities 
Given a number of relevant externalities of an alternative, the question is how the inves-
tor is able to reduce the relevance of these effects with respect to the affected persons in 
order to ensure the later success of the investment. Assuming that the possibilities of 
research and development for an integrated technological melioration of the alternative 
can be considered as exhausted, then three strategies (see figure 2) for diminution of 
the relevance of these effects are still at the disposal of the investor. Only if the costs of 
setting up these strategies exceed the additional success of this alternative compared with 
the second best, will the investor give up the investment alternative in question. 
F i g u r e 2: S t r a t e g i e s f o r R e l e v a n c e R e d u c t i o n o f I n v e s t m e n t E x t e r n a l i t i e s 
1. Information 
a) before decision 
after decision 
b) restriction 
expansion 
c) institutionalized 
occasional 
2. Elimination 
a) real 
monetary 
b) individual 
collective 
c) Single 
cooperative 
3. Participation 
a) real 
symbolic 
b) direct 
indirect 
c) institutionalized 
informal 
/. I n f o r m a t i o n 
The strategy of information aims at the prevention, weakening or removal of the attitudes 
which strengthen the relevance of negative externalities. By influence on the information 
ievel, the decision makers try to remove the cognitive basis of the injury perceived by the 
affected persons. This strategy can already be applied b e f o r e the final decision. Often jt is 
applied a f t e r the decision during the phase of implementation. Under certain circum-
stances the rise of negative attitudes towards the investment may be prevented by r e s t r i c -
t i o n of the passing of relevant inside informations; by actively i n c r e a s i n g the information 
basis of the affected persons and possibly by clarification and explanation activities, the 
volume of suspected or perceived injuring externalities may be limited. An n s t i t u t i o n -
a l i z a t i o n of such information activities, e. g., a periodic social account, is as possible as 
o c c a s i o n a l problem orientated public relations. 
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2. E l i m i n a t i o n 
The strategy of elimination aims at an avoidance or at a reparation of the caused relevant 
externalities. Thereby, to a greater extent, the investors, i. e. the participants of the 
decision, will turn into those affected by their decision consequences. This strategy can 
provide for a r e a l avoidance of the arising effects or for a m o n e t a r y compensation of the 
affected persons. It may address i n d i v i d u a l l y to the benefit of Single affected persons or 
c o l l e c t i v e l y to a group of affected persons. Finally, the investor is able to act o n h i s o w n 
or conjoint with others, e. g., in a c o o p e r a t i v e association. 
3. P a r t i c i p a t i o n 
The strategy of participation aims at an integration of the affected persons into the 
investment decision process. The supposed future affected persons will turn into a partici-
pating party in the decision and, therewith, be able to bring in their interests and needs 
immediately and early. A participation strategy is to diminish the rise of relevant negative 
externalities from the outset and to guarantee the later loyality to the decision con-
sequences. Fundamental problems of application of this type of strategy, which today 
is frequently favoured in public discussions, are that the group of those who are to 
participate may vary depending on the type of investment and the kind of externalities 
under discussion, that this group may also differ from the circle of future affected per-
sons, and that the number of the affected persons is frequently very high. 
The decision participation may happen in r e a l terms, i. e. the affected persons are actually 
integrated into the internal decision process with the possiblity of negociation and infor-
mation. Then they are explicitly responsible for the treated decision as far as they are 
consenting. In some cases such a real participation may lead to a (vertical) integration of 
the investor with one or many affected parties. 
The participation may also be s y m b o l i c , namely then, when a great number of the affect-
ed persons without a complete information basis are asked for their agreement in a formal 
act 1 4 . Such a procedure especially serves the later loyality to the alternative in ques-
tion and is normally not suitable for altering the chosen alternative. 
D i r e c t participation means that those affected personally take part in the decision process 
or in parts of the decision process. I n d i r e c t participation means that affected groups send 
representatives or experts into the decision group (e. g. board of directors) l s. 
Finally the participation of the possible affected persons in the investment decision pro-
cess may be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d (e. g. by special legal rights); furthermore, with respect to 
special investments periodical supplementary decisions and revisions may be institution-
alized in which those affected could again participate. In many cases, however, participa-
tion will happen i n f o r m a l l y and sporadically by inclusion of, e. g., environment experts 
into parts of the investment decision process. 
The. strategy of participation touches fundamental questions of the constitutional rights 
of the firm. If the real participation in the investment decision process is extended to 
external groups, then this fact, for example, could influence the independence, the 
velocity and the competitiveness of the investment decision. Therefore, it must be ques-
tioned how many additional voting members may be taken up into the decision commit-
tee in the case of a real participation of affected persons. On one hand, the finding of a 
consensus should not become too difficult and expensive. But on the other hand, the un-
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desired relevant externalities should be reduced to an efficiency increasing extent. If no 
relevant externality is desired at all, then all individuals externally affected in a relevant 
way should be included into the investment decision group and should be equipped 
with a right of veto. Beyond that group only unimportant externalities are to appear as 
well as such decision consequences for which the market exclusion principle or other 
institutional rights are valid. Such a method seems very unrealistic and unpractical, 
indeed, and it causes high costs. However, by sporadic or symbolic participation, as well 
as by determination of the necessary consenting votes, the decision procedure can be 
changed in such a way that disadvantages of further extending the decision group and 
advantages of additionally avoiding undesired externalities equalize themselves from the 
investor's view 1 6 . 
Aspects of Strategy Selection 
If the diminution of relevant externalities becomes part of investment planning process, 
then an evaluation of the possible strategies wüTbe necessary. 
Externalities can be interpreted as that vast field of decision interdependencies which 
so far is neither coordinated by the market nor by legal norms. It would be wrong to sup-
pose that the undesired externalities of investment decision could be removed by the ap-
plication of several volunteer strategies or legal instruments without again causing some 
externalities by these measures. As social values change depending on several of the above 
mentioned conditions, it is, possible in principle, that the internalization produces rele-
vant side effects which are able to partiy compensate the importance of the perceived 
internalized effects (for example new, possibly more negatively valued environmental 
burdens by technical environmental progress; increased resistance those who are excluded 
of the participation). Such indirect effects of strategy selection are only rarely discussed, 
especially because they are also hard to grasp. Compared with that, the immediate costs 
and benefits of the strategy application are more intensively regarded when selecting 
strategies, provided that the investor has a chance of choosing at all. 
While all three mentioned types of strategy costs of the strategy application may be 
estimated in vague terms, the valuation of the benefit, induced by one of the strategies, 
causes the greatest difficulties. Because of this, firms would probably choose the type of 
strategy with the least expenses. Frequently, that is the strategy of information policy. 
The strategy of elimination, for the purpose of anticipative diminution of externalities 
which in many cases is very expensive, will be chosen less often. This strategy seems to be 
more an dement of a supplementary investment policy which in this way meets external 
pressure exerted during the phase of investment impiementation. Only when the sup-
posed reactions of the business environment seem to become more costly than an antici-
pative elimination, would such a strategy probably a part of investment planning. Pro-
ducers of environmental protection technology might recommend and promote the 
strategy of real anticipative elimination within their marketing of investment goods. 
Elimination and information are often strictly connected strategies because an elimina-
tion of an externality may be a welcome opportunity for public relation activities of the 
firm. 
Because of the high uncertainty of the benefit-cost-analysis of the participation strategy 
the Utility of this kind of action is difficult to be reliably estimated in advance. Espe-
cially, the risks of business policy which can be connected with a participation of the 
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affected persons are frequently estimated higher than the future advantages which are 
thereby possibly reachable. This is perhaps an additional explanation for the fact that, 
voluntarily, firms only seldom take advantage of a real instituionalized participation of 
the affected persons in an investment decision and in place of that restrict themselves to a 
sporadic interrogation of experts and of Single affected persons. However, it might be 
questionable whether this behavior can in all cases be regarded as rational1 7. 
If the risk preference of the decision makers towards possible repercussions of exter-
nalities is high, all Strategie alternatives are considered as too expensive compared with 
their expected benefit. In this case, the firm acts more defensively. It gives up its own 
ex ante initiatives in this field and adapts to the actual official demands. In times in which 
the question of whether firms effect any investment at all is more important than the 
question what consequences investment will have such a behavior is particularly probable. 
On the other hand, risk averters as well as periods of booming investment behavior 
will favour adoption of the strategies. 
As mentioned above and as the investor considers only those externalities which are 
probably relevant for his goal achievement, there remain many cases in which exter-
nalities appear relevant only to public institutions. Then, the internalization of these 
effects is aecomplished or furthered by public measures: instruments of tax policy, 
Orders and prohibitions of certain individual and collective actions, interferences into the 
legal framework of business, all methods variously treated in literature. 
Concluding Remarks 
Business environment has become more and more complex and dynamic. Social, political, 
legal, technological and world-wide economic changes are shaking the basis of business 
strategy, i. e. especially the investment strategy. Investment behavior which some years 
ago seemed to be widely aeeepted, suddenly faces resistance, and vice versa. Under these 
circumstances, management has to direct its sensitivity not only to market forces but also 
to non-market interdependencies Coming from its business activities. Economic theory 
teaches a clear cut frontier between internal and external effects of economic activity, 
but in practice the strict seperation can no longer be assumed in the face of the real 
dynamics of the socio-economic environment. The pereeption, interpretation, and polic-
ing of "weak Signals" should therefore be extended to this area 1 8. In this sense, sensible 
anticipative considerations of alleged investment externalities, of their possible relevance 
for internal success and of internalization strategies seem to be unavoidable for a well 
founded business policy. The framework developed in this paper could support the 
management of the sketched investment uncertainty. The innovative reduction of rele-
vant externalities can be coneeived as a challenge to Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, 
especially in times of discontinuities. 
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